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Abstract 
This paper reports on IoT4Kids, a study exploring the privacy, security and safety implications of children programming the 
Internet of Things. The study focuses on the BBC micro:bit as one device that allows children to create rudimentary IoT devices. 
Prior publications have described the first stage of this study, which involved workshops with child participants. This paper 
instead focuses on the second stage of the project, which involved conducting key informant interviews with representatives 
from our project partners in order to understand the risks children face with interacting with programmable IoT devices. We 
describe themes that emerged from these interviews, along with implications for the study and for future work in this area.
1 Introduction 
The BBC micro:bit was developed in response to government 
priorities of increasing computer literacy among children 
[1.2], with the BBC seeking to launch a product to help 
children learn physical computing skills by engaging in 
building IoT devices. This initiative was driven in recognition 
that other maker tools on the market (e.g. Raspberry Pi and 
Arduino) can be difficult for novices to use, hence the 
micro:bit’s developers aimed to lower the threshold for 
programming so that such tools were accessible to children 
without coding being the essential goal of their making 
activity. 
 
Figure 1: The BBC micro:bit. 
 
Due to privacy and security concerns that may arise in the 
context of programmable IoT for child users, the micro:bit’s 
developers decided to limited some of the functionality that 
makes it an IoT device, though the ambition remains to launch 
the tool with full IoT capability following more thorough risk 
assessment process. The PETRAS funded Iot4Kids project 
was inspired by this need for greater understanding of the risks 
associated with the BBC micro:bit specifically, and with IoT 
technology for children more generally. Working in 
partnership with The Family Online Safety Institute (FOSI), 
the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children 
(NSPCC) and the Micro:bit foundation, the project aimed to 
identify current and anticipated risks associated with the 
micro:bit and similar devices aimed at children in order to 
understand how to effectively mitigate against these risks. 
 
In this paper, we focus on the second stage of the IoT4Kids 
project – after we had collected data about what devices 
children would likely use the micro:bit to create, identified 
different categories of use and potential risks therein, and 
translated these into risks into provisional Use Scenarios. 
Here, we report on the feedback we received from our project 
partners regarding the findings from this prior stage. We 
describe how interviews and a Knowledge Exchange 
workshop informed a more rounded understanding of the types 
of abuse children are susceptible to and the ways in which such 
abuse may be facilitated by IoT technologies. We also describe 
the various considerations by The Micro:bit Educational 
Foundation in developing the BBC micro:bit, and how these 
risks were mapped against certain features of the tool. Finally, 
we end with our thoughts regarding a guiding philosophy for 
safeguarding children from IoT risk – what we have dubbed 
‘learning to fall safely’ – and potential directions forward in a 
multipronged strategy for realising safe IoT.    
 
2. Methodology 
2.1 Project overview 
The IoT4Kids project comprises three stages. In stage one, 57 
children (ages 9-11) were invited to take part in Outreach 
Days, where they explored how they might wish to use the 
BBC micro:bit [3]. They were guided through a creative 
exercise to elicit sketches and descriptions of their ideas for 
devices they would want to build. Analysis of this data was 
used to identify three categories of use (Assistance, 
Companionship and Play) within which different clusters of 
risk emerge. These risks were elaborated in the form of Use 
Scenarios, i.e. fictional amalgamations of the participants’ 
designs, crafted to illustrate emerging privacy and security 




We focus in this paper on stage two, where we sought to 
bolster the use scenarios with information gleaned from our 
project partners. The National Society for the Prevention of 
Cruelty to Children (NSPCC) and the Family Online Safety 
Institute (FOSI) provided expertise in predatory behaviour to 
help us anticipate threats to children; and The Micro:bit 
Educational Foundation provided information regarding the 
necessary tech components and skills for realising children’s 
desired uses of the mirco:bit, as well as known uses of the tool 
by children to date. Feedback was solicited from these project 
partners in order to further refine and expand the set of Use 
Scenarios.  
In stage three, the resulting Use Scenarios were then used as a 
basis from which to derive questions that should be asked to 
help mitigate against the risks identified in the scenarios. 
These questions were categorised into four Risk Zones: 1) 
Authority and Discipline; 2) Malevolence and Accidental 
Harm; 3) Emotionality and Socialization; and 4) Governance 
and Accounting. These Risk Zones and guiding questions 
therein comprise our Risk Mitigation Checklist, a tool to be 
used by developers and policymakers to anticipate and 
proactively attend to risks of IoT technologies [4]. 
2.2 Details of stage two 
We conducted five interviews with six participants. 
Participants were drawn from project partner organisations: 
five were from The Micro:bit Educational Foundation, the 
consortium of organisations that developed the BBC micro:bit; 
and the other one was drawn from our project partner FOSI. 
The goal of these activities was to better understand the risks 
children might face when interacting with programmable IoT 
devices. Specific objectives were to: 
• better understand predatory behaviour and online safety 
risks for children; 
• map these risks to components of the micro:bit to 
understand barriers to responsible deployment of this tool 
and others like it; and 
• generate insights to help us refine and further develop the 
use scenarios produced during stage one of the project for 
use in stage three. 
 
Semi-structured interviews with representatives from The 
Micro:bit Educational Foundation focused on the barriers 
faced by the development team during the process of designing 
the BBC micro:bit and surrounding infrastructure, and what 
they felt needed to be in place to ensure its responsible 
deployment for child users. Semi-structured interviews with 
representatives from FOSI focused on known predatory 
behaviour as it pertains to online safety, and concerns 
regarding risks to children arising from IoT technologies. All 
interviews took approximately 1 hour. The use scenarios were 
sent to the participants prior to the interviews and were used 
as discussion points to lead the interviews. 
The interviews were recorded using a Livescribe Smart Pen. 
During the interviews key words were jotted down in the 
Livescribe Dot Paper notebook to provide quick referral back 
to interesting interview content. Immediately following 
interviews, the researcher conducting the interviews captured 
notes relating to initial insights. The interviews were 
transcribed and reviewed to heighten familiarity with the data. 
The transcriptions were then coded for emerging themes using 
the comments function in Microsoft Word. Post-It Notes were 
used to help organise these themes as they emerged.  
 
Also contributing to stage two, a Knowledge Exchange 
Workshop was held in order to solicit feedback on the initial 
Use Scenarios and gain insights into predatory behaviour. Four 
Participants agreed to attend, whom were responsible for child 
online safety policy and guidelines. The research team 
travelled to the NSPCC headquarters for the 3-hour workshop. 
Prior to the workshop the NSPCC attendees were emailed the 
use scenarios, along with participant information sheets and 
consent forms. This allowed the participants to familiarise 
themselves with the scenarios beforehand and highlight any 
areas of concern or recommend changes to the scenarios. 
 
Regular team meeting were held in order to discuss the 




3.1 Types of abuse and risk 
The Knowledge Exchange workshop resulted in a clear 
articulation of different types of child abuse that are worth 
considering in the context of children’s online and IoT 
interactions. The first is unknown adult abuse, which is when 
“somebody who doesn’t know the child contacts them online 
and then proceeds to develop a trusting relationship with them 
and then it leads onto abuse” (P2, NSPCC). This kind of abuse 
fits with traditional notions of ‘Stranger Danger’, which may 
happen either online or offline.  
The second form is known adult abuse – i.e. abuse by family 
members, teachers, coaches, etc. – which is significantly more 
common: “90% of abuse happens within the home, so actually 
when we are talking about abuse and neglect,  quite often it 
something within a family circumstance” (P2, NSPCC). P2 
went on to say, “Then there’s grooming by a known adult that 
could be say, a sports coach, that develops a relationship with 
a child and then they are using technology to facilitate that, 
because the big thing is the big benefit but also risk is with all 
this online technology is that it provides very private 
mechanisms for communication, that just would not have 
existed in any other face to face, telephone type of 
communication, like from 30 years ago.”  
The third form is peer-to-peer abuse, which is often not 
recognized by the victim in the early stages, but is 
characterised by “cohesion, control and manipulation” (P2, 
NSPCC). Peer-to-peer abusers can utilise technology in order 
to facilitate the abuse, gaining the trust of the victim and then 
manipulating him/her. 
Up until this point, our thinking had focused largely on the less 
common unknown adult abuse, i.e. predators making contact 
with and grooming children [5]. This may be because of the 
recent headlines regarding, for example, the use of Minecraft 
forums by pedophiles [6]. The interviews further generated a 
number of more specific concerns to guide our research. These 
included cyberbullying, data protection, inappropriate 
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marketing, inappropriate content, mental health, radicalisation 
and health & safety.  
3.1.1 Cyberbullying: FOSI and other child advocate groups 
highlight the concerns of online bullying or cyber bullying. 
Approximately 1 in every 8 children have experienced 
bullying on social media [7]. Cyber bullying can be 
widespread and facilitated through social media. It is defined 
as the use of the internet and digital technologies in order to 
tease, threaten, upset or humiliate someone [8]. 
3.1.2 Data protection: The General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) provision relating to children’s data seeks 
to enhance the protection of children’s personal data as well as 
ensuring that companies explain clearly to young people what 
data is being collected, and how it is stored and used. A child 
is classed as anyone under the age of 18 [9]. Social network 
sites do specify a requirement of 13 years of age in order for 
consent during the sign up to the service [9], but in reality 
“almost 1 in 4 of 8 to 11-year-olds and 3 in 4 of 12 to 15-year-
olds” [7] have some form of social media profile. 
3.1.3 Inappropriate marketing: Individuals are exposed to a 
myriad of advertising campaigns when online. Younger people 
may not have the same capacity to filter this information, 
which is why marketing to children requires additional ethical 
consideration. Children’s data may be used for marketing 
purposes, however the GDPR “makes clear that any marketing 
must be fair and not exploit the vulnerability of children” [10]. 
3.1.4 Inappropriate content: As more children watch and 
engage with online materials, the risks associated with viewing 
inappropriate content has increased. Traditional means of 
viewing visual content via television channels were vetted and 
curated via corporation responsible for broadcasting. There 
have been instances of children accessing inappropriate 
content disguised as their favourite cartoon characters via 
YouTube. Our informants explained that it is a widely held 
assumption by parents that YouTube is the same as watching 
BBC, with many abdicating responsibility for overseeing 
viewing, thinking “it is doing  something, when actually it is 
not doing what you think” (P2, NSPCC). 
3.1.5 Mental health: Studies in recent years have begun to link 
the wide spread use of online platforms and social media to 
negative mental wellbeing, in particular to reduction in self-
esteem and healthy self-image [11]. The use of technology 
within the context of competitive sports was highlighted as a 
concern in the interviews, as it was seen to promote constant 
monitoring of personal activity (e.g. step counters). This was 
seen to potentially exacerbate behavior related to eating 
disorders; and there was potential risk of such data being 
leveraged for known adult abuse, e.g. a sports coach telling an 
athlete “you have not run far enough” (P4, NSPCC).  
3.1.6 Radicalisation: The Internet is one of the most effective 
means to spread extremist ideologies and promote terrorist 
violence, which is why schools now include elements of online 
safety education pertaining to radicalization. But we note, “In 
reality the radicalization of children is rare and particularly 
nuanced, and far from a linear process that exclusively occurs 
online” [12]. 
3.1.7 Health & safety: Interviews with the Micro:bit 
Educational Foundation revealed that health and safety risks 
influenced the design of the BBC micro:bit, e.g. when 
considering how it was going to be powered. While such risks 
were mitigated in the design, our key informants noted that 
most of the health and safety risks emerge as a result of the 
build process itself, e.g. creating devices that could inflict 
intentional or unintentional physical harm to others.  
3.2 Linking risks to desired uses of the BBC micro:bit 
Having elaborated the types of abuse and risk (above), we 
describe below how these risks pertain more specifically to the 
contexts of use for the BBC micro:bit that emerged from the 
participants during stage one of the project (detailed in [3,4]). 
3.2.1 Two-way communication: Many of the designs sketched 
by children in the Outreach Days from stage one involved 
some form of two-way communication. This may be attributed 
to children becoming familiar with technology such as Hello 
Google, Siri and Alexa. Key informants from The Micro:bit 
Educational Foundation explained that they recognised early 
on that enabling communication was essential functionality for 
a tool that children would want to use. There are three ways 
such communication could be achieved, each with different 
degrees of risk. 
 
Wifi was deemed by our key informants to hold high risk, 
despite its undeniable appeal for opening up communication 
opportunities. Concerns were principally rooted in existing 
known risks pertaining to online safety, e.g. the ways in which 
various forms of grooming are facilitated by online 
interactions. For this reason, the micro:bit’s developers 
focused on Bluetooth and Radio communication as a 
mechanism for two-way communication. 
 
Bluetooth was a particular concern during the development of 
the BBC micro:bit. Though originally designed in as a way of 
enabling two-way communication, concerns over what 
information was being received by the other device it was 
paired to prompted developers to temporarily restrict 
Bluetooth. Specifically, developers were concerned about the 
device beaconing out its mac address, which might be 
intercepted by someone 30 metres away (unknown adult abuse 
risk). But additionally, whilst children might have found it 
‘fun’ to send anonymous messages, the development team 
expressed concerns regarding bullying and not being able to 
identify the sender of the message (peer-to-peer abuse risk).  
 
As our key informants explained, a custom radio 
communication component was designed in order to mitigate 
the tracking risks of Bluetooth, whilst still having a 
functionality that would inspire children. Most devices have 
an identifier, but this radio does not and therefore all data is 
sent anonymously. There is no source address and no 
destination address; children can share simple messages and 
commands within a closed space (e.g. the classroom) without 
revealing identifying information. Our informants describe 
their approach as one of making data non-personal and 




3.2.2 Personal or sensitive data collection and storage: Key 
informants revealed that consideration of data collected 
through the micro:bit played a vital role in shaping the device 
and the development of supporting platforms. One participant 
highlighted that during the BBC micro:bit development “We 
did start to look at this, if you’re looking at the micro:bit itself 
as collecting data that seems fine, it’s the step where you take 
the data off the micro:bit and then store it, you know apart from 
the obvious ones, which is who has access to that data, where 
is that data stored, then this is leading to all the data security 
stuff”(P9, Micro:bit Educational Foundation). 
Developers were cognizant that what seems like innocuous 
data can actually become very sensitive and put children at 
risk. With the case of the micro:bit great consideration was 
taken to ensure data collecting and transmitted remained non-
personal and could not be identifiable to the child. When 
children were to start to build devices which included cameras 
and microphones the risks increase, with additional forms of 
data that may inadvertently identify a child. IoT devices were 
noted for their ability to transmit very intimate data: “data 
knowing when someone is moving, when someone is 
stationary, I mean obviously if it is a bed, you know when 
someone is sleeping, then you have concerns around general 
safety” (P1, FOSI). 
 
Storage of personally identifying data was also a concern from 
the outset for the BBC micro:bit’s developers. The GDPR 
outlines that organisations need to have transparency and 
accountability when it comes to handling children’s data [13]; 
and high profile failures of IoT toys such as the My Friend 
Cayla doll [14] made clear how important it is to protect 
against hacking, and how such hacks could have far reaching 
consequences both for the safety and privacy of the child and 
for the reputation of the company.  
 
3.2.3 Surveillance: Designs generated by our child participants 
in stage one revealed that children frequently imagined devices 
with some form of tracking or surveillance.  Notably, they did 
not express any concern over tracking or being tracked. One 
participant (P4, NSPCC) who had attended one of the IoT4kids 
Outreach Days in stage one expressed having been “really 
struck by how relaxed” children were in coming up with 
concepts that enabled parents could use the technology as a 
mechanism for discipline through surveillance. Our NSPCC 
informants noted that surveillance devices are and could be 
used for more malevolent purposes within the home (i.e. 
known adult abuse): “If you are a parent or uncle or someone 
who is abusing a child, if you could have one of these 
micro:bits in a room and you could be like, ‘If you tell anyone 
I am going to know,’ things like that. It’s like you have  put on 
that additional layer, you have the shame, you have the fear, 
you have the not really knowing what is going on but you also 
have got that thing that you have got no privacy whatsoever, 
that you can’t talk about these things” (P2, NSPCC). 
 
The covert nature of devices was seen by our key informants 
as another potential area of concern. The BBC micro:bit 
development team had considered apps which would link to 
phone cameras via Bluetooth to take ‘selfies’ in order to appeal 
to young people, but “child protection was concerned about 
people placing the phones and then them being able to 
remotely use them, and then taking videos with no sound” (P6, 
Micro:bit Educational Foundation). In order to reduce the risk, 
the development team considered an alarm that make sounds 
when the picture was taken. The team was also cognizant of 
risks associated with microphones, as in prior cases of security 
flaws with connected toys in which private conversations were 
recorded and then easily accessible by hackers [14].  
3.2.4 Infrastructure Provision: A number of the children’s 
designs from stage one entailed creating some form of profile. 
Concerns were raised regarding a potential lack of 
understanding on the part of the child about what data is being 
collected and where their data is going, and therefore what the 
risks are that they are entering into. Participants noted in 
particular the lack of trusted organisations with which a child 
might create a profile. According to one participant, “The child 
could build [a device] taking safety precautions and telling 
their parents everything about the device, but if they upload 
the data with the best of their intentions onto a website and 
then they could have data breach, because then that data is out 
there, and it can’t be taken back”.  
Key informants explained that they had considered developing 
platforms for children to upload their data, but that the risks 
and costs associated with building such platforms were 
deemed too high, e.g. risk to organisational reputation if 
sensitive data was stolen. Informants suggested the need for a 
mixture of child education, adults overseeing activity, and 
trusted sites. Specifically, children would need to be guided to 
sites that meet “certain standards, then safeguarding and 
government safety standards” (P4, NSPCC), where the parents 
or guardians could tell their children “You are only allowed to 
download code from this site and if you get code from that site 




4.1 Adult responsibility and safe play 
In its current state, with radio communication and Bluetooth 
pairing functionality restricted and with its use being limited 
to safe (closed) environments, the BBC micro:bit poses 
effectively zero risks to children. The tradeoff is that its 
potential is severely limited: “you could lock the whole system 
down so that it becomes a pointless education system and kids 
could be learning nothing, or you can start to open that up to a 
point where they will start to learn stuff and even about the 
security, but of course when [you] do that they become more 
and more insecure'' (P9, The Micro:bit Foundatio). Moreover, 
locking this one device down does nothing to prepare children 
for safely navigating the wider world of IoT devices that they 
are likely to encounter, most of which will not have been 
designed with such a clear ethical imperative and focus on 
vulnerabilities of child users. What would an approach look 
like that sought to prepare children to interact safely with the 
full range of IoT technologies they could encounter? 
 
The metaphor of a playground might be instructive here. A 
playground is a space designed specifically for safe play: 
“Both social, emotional and physical risk happen in play, what 
we tend to do around play is to put enough stuff around to say 
that the emotional, social and physical risk within that [can be] 
managed by an adult” (P9, The Micro:bit Educational 
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Foundation). Our initial approach to this project, and the 
approach taken by the BBC and The Micro:bit Educational 
Foundation consortium in developing the micro:bit, was to 
design a digital playground: a safely constructed, gated space 
for children to play and take risks, “to experiment… with 
emotional, social and technical constructs that they are going 
to have to deal with as adults,” (P9) under the supervision of 
parents, carers or teachers. The risks to the child in the digital 
playground are minimized as long as a) the adults supervising 
the play are sufficiently knowledgable of “the potential 
implications of what [the children] get up to” (P1, FOSI), b) 
these adults are vigilant and ever present, and c) the children 
do not venture out of the playground. 
 
Consider instead an alternative strategy that is less demanding 
of those in supervisory roles and allows greater freedom for 
children to explore the world beyond the gate: namely teaching 
children how to fall safely. On a playground, the risks of falling 
are literal, and there are techniques that can be taught for 
falling safely, such as crouching, relaxing one's body, landing 
on fleshy parts of the body rather than putting hands down, 
rolling. In the digital realm, we mean ‘fall’ metaphorically, as 
in doing something that could result in harm. What would 
children need to know to be able to fall safely in the world of 
IoT?  
4.2 Directions going forward 
Our findings appear to imply the need for a multipronged 
strategy for mitigating risks to children. We identify four areas 
where effort may be focused. 
 
4.2.1 Industry: The BBC micro: bit was developed with a clear 
imperative to protect child users. Ideally other companies 
would take this approach, carefully considering the risks to 
children as they develop their products. It may be beneficial to 
formalise this process, e.g. developing a framework that 
enables companies to progress through a series of relevant 
considerations. We have attempted to provide a start for such 
a framework with our Risk Mitigation Checklist emerging 
from stage three (currently in submission), though such efforts 
would be best led by a consortium of leading companies. 
 
4.2.2 Policy and Guidelines: As noted by the NSPCC, some 
companies have not been compelled to make changes to their 
products until threatened with government enforcement. 
Typically organisations such as FOSI and the NSPCC liaise 
with government to inform new legislation, but as above, 
legislation would be better informed by industry being 
proactive in raising concerns about trends they foresee and 
new capabilities that may affect risk. 
 
4.2.3 Responsible adults: Organisations such as FOSI and the 
NSPCC provide materials to educate parents around online 
safety. Such materials need continual revision to keep apace 
with technological change, and clearly need updating for the 
context of IoT. A particular hurdle in creating effective 
materials of this sort is the complexity and ambiguous nature 
of IoT which makes it difficult for parents to fully grasp, much 
less oversee responsibly. 
 
4.2.4 Education: This is the area we are keen to explore in 
future work. Moving away from our earlier efforts to identify 
problematic components of the micro:bit and redesigning them 
for safe use, the next step for our research will be to develop 
experiential, micro:bit based curricula that confers 
fundamental lessons in both ethics and online safety that 
children will need to grasp to capitalize on the technological 
cornucopia available to them whilst remaining safe. We 
envisage this taking the form of ‘workshops-in-a-box’ 
containing step-by-step build instructions and all the necessary 
component (sensors, wires, clips), along with detailed lesson 
plans that educators can use in the classroom to progress 
children through a series of prompts to provide consideration 
of salient principles. Adhering to the notion introduced above 
of ‘learning to fall safely’, these workshops would allow 
children to explore risk rather than being risk averse. We 
believe this approach complements well executed privacy by 
design, and is highly transferable to new and unpredictable 
technological contexts, including a future in which IoT is passé 
and all new digital interactions are on offer. A challenge we 
anticipate in developing these workshops-in-a-box is the need 
to customise material for different stages of psychological and 
moral development, perhaps even starting with children much 




The interviews and workshop reported in this paper helped 
highlight the subversive nature of IoT technologies, which 
increases the likelihood of them being used for abuse. Our key 
informants stressed the need to develop ways of thinking about 
IoT risk in a future filled with unknowns. The strategy we used 
to facilitate productive thought about risks was to engage 
children in developing sketches of desired uses of the 
micro:bit, translating those into Use Scenarios, and then 
seeking expert feedback on the risks posed by these uses of 
IoT technology. While this approach has its limitations – 
namely it focused discussions around the BBC micro:bit which 
is unquestionably the safest IoT device for children – our 
project partners found the scenarios useful for thinking about 
risk. Interestingly, our interviews revealed that the process 
used by the BBC micro:bit developers yielded very similar 
considerations to those we had identified through our Use 
Scenarios. This suggests that such a method might be used to 
formalise the design thinking that goes into developing new 
IoT devices for children.  
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